A friend of mine described mathematics as: (the study of) the structure of structure. I really liked this, as it makes the whole field seem concrete. It inspired me to rethink how I regard the sciences.

The description approximates how I can imagine some would want to describe philosophy, and I can see how some would take this as an argument to give up philosophy in favor of (the more rigorous) field of mathematics. So, my thoughts have primarily been regarding how philosophy (and radicals, really) should relate to science, and what the sciences are, if mathematics is supposed to be a science and not a philosophy. Considering I am currently working some posts on philosophical applications of concepts from dynamical systems theory, it seems like a good idea to explore what it means for philosophy to engage with science.

Some of my recent thoughts on the sciences. Firstly:

The sciences are as much a part of existence as any living organism. That is, we should not only see the sciences as logical systems that are to be overlayed on (or overcoding) the rest of existence, but also as lifeforms. They are at the same time still logical systems, much in the way a body can be regarded as one, although an extremely complicated one. One example is in Samuel Becketts Molloy – the body of Molloy almost being a sort of bureacratic entity, with an ever-changing logic, making it close to impossible to understand for anyone outside of it. However, the logic of the system is deeply entangled in the way it functions (as two sides of the same coin) – but the map is not the terrain. Science is both a map and terrain. Or rather, it is a terrain that functions by creating maps. Or, it is a terrain made of maps that are constantly redrawn. Secondly:

The sciences do not require philosophy to justify them with an ontology which would attempt to make them objective. The only justification needed for the sciences are their own existence. They are just another part of existence, that I believe can have a mutually beneficial relationship with philosophy (just like all other parts of existence). This engagement should not be on terms of trying to reduce the complexity of each other. Thirdly:

If science is seen as both a logical system and an organism, what philosophy should engage in when considering the sciences is both a critical approach and a pragmatic one. These approaches often overlap. By a critical approach, I mean:

examining the sciences as logical systems, but at the same time avoiding doing this in the form of ”critizising X from the perspective of Y”. Is there anything more boring than seeing someone provide a marxist critique of liberalism, or vice versa? Any perspective can always be critiqued by another – you can always take the ideas of one perspective, and read them through the lens of another. This says absolutely nothing about which of the two perspectives in question is ”more correct” – all it proves is that perspectives can be used to overcode others, and that they become something else in this new context. Of course, this can still be a valid method to highlight how your perspective differs from another, or how your perspective functions – but it says nothing about which of those perspectives ”is the best”. The critical approach needs to be immanent to the specific science science, engaging with the ideas on their own premise. To do this, as a philosopher, you need to become a scientist – or as a scientist, you need to become a philosopher. I believe this is what a philosopher of any science should be. What you are doing in this role is becoming a functionary of science, for example in working by connecting sciences to other sciences, or to aspects of life. By a pragmatic approach I mean:

seeing the sciences as an organism engaging with the rest of the world. By this, you instead see them in the way they live, the processes inherent to them, and how they interact with the rest of the world: seeing how the sciences operates; what they do rather than what they are. Here you can find ideas of how the sciences are (self-organizing and living) tools of colonialism or capitalism. An example:

Let’s say you want to combat how certain science / scientists reinforces transphobia. The truth might at times be the best tool for this (considering how bad the science in those articles often is), but not necessarily. What you should do is find the most effective weapon you can. This does not necessitate brutality, ”meanness”, or similar (although they are at times very relevant), rather it is seeing what actually makes the change happen. We should let go of liberal ideas of the marketplace of ideas. Are we not supposed to be revolutionaries? It is not a debate, it is a war!